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UNSECURED (BLACK) BODIES: HOW
BALTIMORE FORESHADOWS THE DANGERS OF
RACIALLY TARGETED DRAGNET POLICING
LET LOOSE BY UTAH V. STRIEFF
Lucius T. Outlaw III *

I. INTRODUCTION
“The Court today holds that the discovery of a warrant for an unpaid parking
ticket will forgive a police officer’s violation of your Fourth Amendment rights.” 1
With this sentence, Justice Sonia Sotomayor unleashes a fierce admonishment of the
majority opinion (drafted by Justice Clarence Thomas) in Utah v. Strieff 2 and the
majority’s lack of understanding of (and empathy for) those who will suffer the
consequences of the Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement that the ends-justifiesthe means in policing. As Justice Sotomayor recognizes, and this article argues using
Baltimore as backdrop, Strieff not only provides further judicial cover for racially
targeted dragnet policing 3 of our cities’ black residents, but the opinion encourages
such invidiously discriminatory policing.
This article strives to add to the growing criticism of Strieff in three ways.
First, it adds to the chorus of work exposing and criticizing the flawed legal reasoning
of the majority opinion. 4 Next, by using Baltimore, Maryland’s recent policing
history, this article shows how racially targeted dragnet policing was already a fact

*
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1. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
2. See id.
3. “Racially targeted dragnet policing” as used in this article means police systematically subjecting
large numbers of non-white residents to investigatory stops unsupported by individualized reasonable
suspicion, probable cause, or in response to a description of a suspect, but rather for reasons that resemble
or constitute racial profiling, as a tactic to detect crime. See generally Guy Padula, Utah v. Streiff:
Lemonade Stands and Dragnet Policing, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 469, 478–83 (2017) (defining dragnet
policing and discussing how it interacts with racial profiling).
4. See, e.g., id.; Allison Bruff, Ripe for Rejection: A Methodology for States’ Departure from Utah
v. Strieff and its Poisonous Fruit, 86 MISS. L.J. 833 (2017); Julian A. Cook III, The Wrong Decision at
the Wrong Time: Utah v. Strieff in the Era of Aggressive Policing, 70 SMU L. REV. 293 (2017); Josephine
Ross, Warning: Stop-and-Frisk May Be Hazardous to Your Health, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 689
(2016); Emily J. Sack, Illegal Stops and the Exclusionary Rule: The Consequences of Utah v. Strieff, 22
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 263 (2017); Jackson D. Wagner, Stop and Exploit: What Remains of the
Constitutional Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures After Strieff, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 383
(2017).
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of life pre-Strieff for many black residents of our cities, and how this discriminatory
policing tactic is fortified and encouraged by Strieff. Finally, this article explains why
Justice Thomas’s claim that his opinion will not lead to increased invidious dragnet
policing because of the threat and availability of civil liability is misguided and
divorced from reality.
II. BACKGROUND: UTAH V. STRIEFF
In December 2006, South Salt Lake City Narcotics Detective Douglas
Fackrell began investigating an anonymous tip about “narcotics activity” at a
particular house. 5 During intermittent surveillance of the house for about a week,
Detective Fackrell observed enough visitors to the house leaving a few minutes after
arriving to suspect that the occupants of the house were distributing drugs. 6
On the day at issue, Edward Strieff was one of the visitors the detective
observed. 7 Detective Fackrell observed Mr. Strieff exit the house and walk toward a
convenience store nearby. 8 The detective did not know, however, when Mr. Strieff
had entered the suspected drug house, or how long he had been in the house. 9
Therefore, the detective “lacked a sufficient basis to conclude that Strieff was a shortterm visitor who may have been consummating a drug transaction.” 10 Nonetheless,
in the store’s parking lot, the detective stopped Mr. Strieff, identified himself as law
enforcement, requested that Mr. Strieff produce identification, and asked Mr. Strieff
what he had been doing at the suspected drug house. 11 In response, Mr. Strieff
produced his Utah identification card. 12 Detective Fackrell relayed Mr. Strieff’s
identity information to a police dispatcher, who responded that Mr. Strieff had an
outstanding warrant for a traffic violation. 13 The detective arrested Mr. Strieff
pursuant to the outstanding warrant and searched Mr. Strieff. 14 The search yielded a
small bag of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia (hereinafter the “drug
evidence”). 15
Mr. Strieff was charged with unlawful possession of drugs and drug
paraphernalia. He moved to suppress the drug evidence on the ground that it derived
from an unlawful stop. 16 During the motion hearing, the State conceded that
Detective Fackrell lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop, but
argued that the motion should nonetheless be denied because the outstanding warrant
attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the discovery of the drug

5. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2060.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2063 (“First, he had not observed what time Strieff entered the suspected drug house, so he
did not know how long Strieff had been there.”).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2060.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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evidence. 17 The trial court agreed with the State and denied Mr. Strieff’s suppression
motion.
Mr. Strieff subsequently pled guilty to attempted possession of a controlled
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, but reserved the right to appeal the
denial of his suppression motion, which he did appeal. 18 The Utah Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court. 19 The Utah Supreme Court reversed because Mr. Strieff did
not commit a voluntary act to trigger the attenuation doctrine. 20 According to Utah’s
high court, the attenuation doctrine applies only where “a voluntary act of the
defendant’s free will (as in a confession or consent to search)” breaks the connection
between an illegal search and the discovery of the evidence at issue. 21
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to “resolve disagreement about how
the attenuation doctrine applies where an unconstitutional detention leads to the
discovery of a valid arrest warrant.” 22 Early in the majority opinion, Justice Thomas
rejected the Utah Supreme Court’s belief that the attenuation doctrine applies only
when there is intervening voluntary act by the defendant. According to Justice
Thomas, the “attenuation doctrine evaluates the causal link between the
government’s unlawful act and the discovery of evidence, which often has nothing
to do with a defendant’s actions.” 23 Therefore, the only valid question in play, in
Justice Thomas’s view, was “whether the discovery of a valid arrest warrant was a
sufficient intervening event to break the causal chain between the unlawful stop and
the discovery of drug-related evidence on Strieff’s person.” 24 To answer that
question, the Justice relied on the three-factor attenuation test articulated in Brown
v. Illinois: 25 (1) the “temporal proximity” between the unconstitutional conduct and
the discovery of the evidence at issue; (2) “the presence of intervening
circumstances;” and (3) “the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” 26
In applying the Brown test, Justice Thomas concluded that the first factor –
temporal proximity – favored Mr. Strieff because the drug evidence was discovered
“only minutes after the illegal stop,” which “counsels in favor of suppression.” 27 The
next two Brown factors were found to favor the State. As discussed in more detail
later, Justice Thomas relied on a case concerning the independent source doctrine –
Segura v. United States 28 – to find that the second Brown factor “strongly favors the

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2061. Justice Thomas defines the attenuation doctrine as follows: “Evidence is admissible
when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been
interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by constitutional guarantee
that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’” Id. (quoting Hudson
v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006)).
24. Id.
25. 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975).
26. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061–62 (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 603–04).
27. Id. at 2062.
28. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
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State.” 29 In finding that the third factor (i.e. purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct)
favored the State, Justice Thomas explained that “Officer Fackrell was at most
negligent” when he unlawfully detained and seized Mr. Strieff, and there was no
evidence that the unlawful conduct was “part of any systematic or recurrent police
misconduct.” 30 With the Brown factors favoring the State two-to-one, Justice
Thomas and the majority held that “[the detective’s] discovery of the arrest warrant
attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from
Strieff incident to arrest,” and reversed the judgment of the Utah Supreme Court. 31
III. STRIEFF’S FLAWED REASONING & DISTORTION OF SEGURA
The Strieff majority held that the Brown attenuation test’s second (presence
of intervening circumstances) and third (purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct)
factors favored the government and weighed against excluding the drug evidence
obtained from Mr. Strieff. The focus here is Justice Thomas’s findings as to the
second factor. To find that the intervening circumstances factor favored the State,
Justice Thomas engaged in a twisted and incomplete interpretation of a case decided
32 years prior: Segura v. United States. 32
A.

Background: Segura v. United States

Mr. Segura’s case started with a tip to drug task force agents that Mr. Segura
and his co-defendant were trafficking cocaine using their shared apartment in New
York. 33 While surveilling Mr. Segura and his co-defendant, the agents observed the
co-defendant deliver a bulk package of suspected narcotics. 34 Shortly thereafter, a
recipient of the package confessed to the agents that the package contained cocaine,
and that he had purchased the cocaine from Mr. Segura. 35 Based on this confession,
the agents obtained permission from a federal prosecutor to arrest Mr. Segura and
his co-defendant, but were advised that because a search warrant for the defendants’
apartment could not be obtained until the next day, the agents should secure (but not
search) the apartment to prevent the destruction of evidence. 36 Despite this
advisement, the agents entered the defendants’ apartment without their consent. 37
Inside the apartment, the agents observed in plain sight some accessories associated
with drug dealing. 38 The agents remained in the apartment to await the warrant, but

29. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062.
30. Id. at 2063.
31. Id. at 2064.
32. 468 U.S. 796 (1984); see Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062 (Justice Thomas relied on Segura because
“the Court addressed similar facts to those here and found sufficient intervening circumstances to allow
the admission of evidence.”).
33. Segura, 468 U.S. at 799.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 800.
36. Id.
37. Id. Mr. Segura had been arrested in the lobby of the apartment building right before the agents
entered his apartment.
38. Id. at 800–01.
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did not search the apartment until a warrant was obtained later the next day. 39 The
search pursuant to the warrant yielded nearly three pounds of cocaine, more than
$50,000 in cash, ammunition, and records of narcotics transactions. 40
The issue that made its way to the Supreme Court was “whether, because
of an earlier illegal entry, the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of evidence
seized later from a private residence pursuant to a valid search warrant which was
issued on information obtained by the police before the [illegal] entry into the
residence.” 41 In other words, did the warrantless (illegal) entry into Mr. Segura’s
apartment taint the evidence that was later discovered pursuant to a valid warrant?
On this question, the Court relied primarily on the independent source doctrine to
side with the government and against suppression. 42 The Court explained that the
independent source doctrine removed any taint from the evidence at issue because
none of the information used to obtain the search warrant derived from the illegal
entry in Mr. Segura’s apartment. 43 Indeed, because the warrant information was
obtained from an independent and lawful source prior to the illegal entry, the Court
brushed aside the illegal entry as “irrelevant.” 44
B.

Justice Thomas & Segura: Misunderstanding and Misuse

As Justice Thomas admits, Segura turned on the independent source
doctrine and not the attenuation doctrine. 45 Nonetheless, in ruling against Mr. Strieff,
Justice Thomas focused on what he perceived as Segura’s suggestion “that the
existence of a valid warrant favors finding that the connection between unlawful
conduct and the discovery of evidence is ‘sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the
taint.’” 46 Even though Segura involved a different warrant exception doctrine,
according to Justice Thomas, the case still supported applying the attenuation
doctrine in Strieff because the arrest warrant, specifically the probable cause
underlying the warrant, was “wholly unconnected” to the unlawful stop. 47 There are
two critical problems with this interpretation and application of Segura.
First, in writing for the majority in Segura, then-Chief Justice Burger was
clear that the Court was resolving the “narrow and precise question” of whether a
court has to suppress evidence not discovered during an initial unlawful entry, but

39. Id. at 800. It is important to note that the application for the warrant did not include any of the
agents’ observations from their warrantless entry into Mr. Segura’s apartment. Id.
40. Id. at 801.
41. Id. at 797–98.
42. See id. at 805 (“In short, it is clear from our prior holdings that ‘the exclusionary rule has no
application [where] the Government learned of the evidence “from an independent source.”’” (quoting
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963)).
43. Id. at 814 (“None of the information on which the warrant was secured was derived from or
related in any way to the initial entry into petitioners’ apartment; the information came from sources
wholly unconnected with the entry and was known to the agents well before the initial entry.”).
44. Id. at 813–14 (“Whether the initial entry was illegal or not is irrelevant to the admissibility of the
challenged evidence because there was an independent source for the warrant under which the evidence
was seized.”).
45. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016) (quoting Segura, 468 U.S. at 815).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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later discovered during a second entry pursuant to a valid warrant. 48 This was the
“only issue” before the Court. 49 The circumstances of Strieff do not fit within these
“narrow and precise” parameters. 50 Factually, Strieff is too dissimilar for Segura to
be an authoritative guide for determining the ramifications for the drug evidence
seized from Mr. Strieff following the unlawful stop. Indeed, as discussed in more
detail later, while the unlawful entry into Mr. Segura’s apartment had no causal
relationship to the discovery of the challenged evidence at issue, the same cannot be
said about unlawful stop and the drug evidence in Strieff.
This leads to the second critical problem with the Justice Thomas’s reliance
on Segura. Again, Justice Thomas and the majority held that in light of Segura the
attenuation doctrine cured the unlawful stop of Mr. Strieff because “the warrant was
valid, it predated Officer Fackrell’s investigation, and it was entirely unconnected
with the [unlawful] stop.” 51 But this rationale appreciates only half of the
requirements that Segura sets for finding sufficient attenuation between unlawful
police conduct and evidence secured by a warrant. Segura is explicit that there is
sufficient attenuation (more accurately, a sufficient independent source) when the
probable cause for a warrant is “wholly unconnected with the [unlawful police
conduct] and was known to the agents well before [the unlawful police conduct].” 52
Both requirements were met in Segura – the warrant was obtained without using any
information obtained by the agents’ unlawful entry into Mr. Segura’s apartment, and
the offending agents were aware of the probable cause used to obtain the warrant
prior to unlawfully entering the apartment. The same cannot be said for Strieff. While
Mr. Strieff’s arrest warrant was secured without any information obtained during the
unlawful stop of Mr. Strieff, Detective Fackrell was unaware of this information
prior to unlawfully stopping Mr. Strieff. 53
The majority in Strieff conveniently ignored Segura’s second requirement.
For the majority it was enough that “the warrant was valid, it predated Detective
Fackrell’s investigation, and it was entirely unconnected with the stop.” 54 Justice
Thomas does not mention, much less discuss, Segura’s second requirement -- that
Detective Fackrell have the untainted knowledge underlying the warrant prior to his
unlawful stop of Mr. Strieff. This is understandable since the facts do not allow this
hurdle to be cleared. Detective Fackrell had no knowledge of the information
(probable cause) that supported Mr. Strieff’s arrest warrant prior to unlawfully
stopping him. In fact, Detective Fackrell had no knowledge of Mr. Strieff at all before
the unlawful stop. 55
The obvious rebuttal to this argument is that Justice Thomas’s rational is
consistent with Segura because the probable cause underlying the warrant for Mr.

48. Segura, 468 U.S. at 804 (“The only issue here is whether drugs and the other items not observed
during the initial entry and first discovered by the agents the day after the entry, under an admittedly valid
search warrant, should have been suppressed.”).
49. Id.
50. Id. (“At the outset, it is important to focus on the narrow and precise question now before us.”).
51. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062.
52. Segura, 468 U.S. at 814 (emphasis added).
53. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2060.
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Strieff’s arrest was generally known to the South Salt Lake City police before
Detective Fackrell’s unlawful conduct. In other words, the counter-argument goes,
Segura is not narrowly limited to where the officers who properly secured a warrant
must be the same officers who committed the unconstitutional stop or search -- that
Segura is focused on the timing and causation relationship between the probable
cause lawfully obtained and the Fourth Amendment violation.
But this counter-argument fails because in Segura the unlawful entry
happened because the agents were attempting to secure evidence that they knew there
was probable cause to seize. The agents knew that a warrant was forthcoming
because they themselves had observed the probable cause justifying a warrant, and
their observations occurred prior to their illegal entry into Mr. Segura’s apartment.
The circumstances in Strieff are far different. Detective Fackrell had no prior
knowledge of the probable cause underlying the arrest warrant for Mr. Strieff, so he
did not stop Mr. Strieff to protect evidence that he already knew there was probable
cause to seize. In sum, Segura involved agents committing a Fourth Amendment
violation with untainted knowledge that a crime was in process, while Strieff
involved a detective committing a Fourth Amendment violation as part of a fishing
expedition based on speculation.
C.

The Causation Gulf between Segura and Strieff

The rebuttal argument equally fails when the “but for” causation test that
plays a central role in Segura, is applied to the circumstances of Strieff. 56 In Segura,
Chief Justice Berger reaffirmed the long-standing principle that suppression is
warranted only if the illegal government activity is “at least the ‘but for’ cause of the
discovery of the evidence.” 57 Mr. Segura, Chief Justice Burger found, could not clear
this fundamental causation hurdle because the “illegal entry into [his] apartment did
not contribute in any way to the discovery of the evidence seized under the
warrant.” 58 The agents’ unlawful entry into Mr. Segura’s apartment had no impact
on the issuance of a valid warrant, nor the execution of the warrant, therefore the
unlawful entry was not a “but for” cause of the discovery of the incriminating
evidence in Segura’s apartment.
In contrast, in Strieff, there is a direct chain of causation from the unlawful
stop to the discovery of the drug evidence. This unbroken chain sufficiently fulfills
the “but for” requirement that is so important under Segura. There is no plausible

56. See Segura, 468 U.S. at 815.
57. Id.; see also Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210 (2014) (“The law has long considered
causation a hybrid concept, consisting of two constituent parts: actual cause and legal cause.”). Actual
cause is more commonly referred to as the “but for” cause because the complained harm or injury would
not have occurred “but for” the conduct at issue. See Univ. of Tex. S. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338,
346–47 (2013) (explaining in Title VII context that the but-for standard “requires the plaintiff to show
‘that the harm would not have occurred’ in the absence of – that is, but for – the defendant’s conduct.”);
see also United States v. James, 534 F. App’x 755, 757 (10th Cir. 2013) (“We define ‘directly’ as requiring
a showing of ‘but-for’ causation, so that a particular loss would not have occurred but for the conduct
underlying the offense of conviction.”); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41
(4th ed. 1971) (“[A]n act or an omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event would
have occurred without it.”).
58. Segura, 468 U.S. at 815 (emphasis added).
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debate that “but for” the unlawful stop, Detective Fackrell would not have discovered
the drug evidence used to arrest and convict Mr. Strieff. The drug evidence obtained
from Mr. Strieff was certainly “in some sense the product of illegal governmental
activity.” 59 Indeed, the warrant check that revealed the arrest warrant for Mr. Strieff
would not have occurred but for the illegal stop that forced Mr. Strieff to provide his
identity information to Detective Fackrell.
This critical and vital difference between the two cases is best exemplified
by the hypothetical alternate scenario posed by Chief Burger in Segura to
demonstrate the soundness of the “but for” test, and how the Fourth Amendment
violation by the agents had no bearing on the discovery of the challenged evidence
in that case. As the Chief Justice posited, had the agents not illegally entered Mr.
Segura’s apartment, but instead established a perimeter to prevent anyone from
entering the apartment to destroy evidence, the challenged evidence would have still
been discovered and seized. 60 In short, subtract the unlawful entry by the agents and
the outcome would have been the same – the discovery of the incriminating evidence
pursuant to a valid warrant. This alternate scenario proved for the Chief Justice that
the agents’ unlawful entry into Mr. Segura’s apartment was “wholly irrelevant” to
the discovery of the evidence pursuant to the search warrant. 61
No comparable alternate scenario exists that cleans the taint on the drug
evidence seized from Mr. Strieff after being illegally stopped. Because Detective
Fackrell had no legal basis to stop Mr. Strieff (as the government conceded), there
was no basis to detain Mr. Strieff until a warrant was obtained or discovered to
already exist, and no warrant would have been granted based on Detective Fackrell’s
mere speculation. Subtract the illegal stop, Detective Fackrell never discovers the
drug evidence, and the story ends much differently for Mr. Strieff. As such, the
factual circumstances of Strieff fulfill the but-for test that is critical for suppression
under Segura.
In reaching his decision in Strieff, Justice Thomas makes one of two
mistakes (if not both) concerning the causation Segura requires for suppression
instead of the application of the attenuation doctrine. The first possibility is that the
Justice misinterpreted Segura’s “but for” standard narrowly to mean that exclusion
of seized evidence is justified only if the warrant would not have been obtained but
for the government’s Fourth Amendment violation. 62 However, nothing in Segura
supports this narrow interpretation. In fact, Segura pushes a very broad view of the
“but for” standard. Segura’s view of “but for,” evidence is sufficiently attenuated
from the government’s illegal conduct only if the conduct “did not contribute in any
way to the discovery of the evidence” and the evidence is not “in some sense the
product of illegal governmental activity.” 63 Chief Burger’s deliberate use of “in any
way” and “in some sense” is a clear signal that the “but for” standard is to be
construed broadly when measuring attenuation. It must be remembered that the issue
before the Court in Segura was whether the agents’ unlawful entry tainted evidence
59. Id. (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980)).
60. Id. at 814.
61. Id.
62. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016) (“In this case, the warrant was valid, it predated
Officer Fackrell’s investigation, and it was entirely unconnected with the [illegal] stop.”).
63. Segura, 468 U.S. at 815 (emphasis added).
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later discovered pursuant to a valid search warrant. Key to the Court’s ruling that the
evidence was not tainted as to require suppression was that the unlawful entry had
no impact whatsoever on the receipt or execution of the warrant. As Chief Justice
Burger’s opinion stresses, the test is whether the outcome (i.e. the discovery of the
incrimination evidence) would have still occurred if the government’s illegal conduct
is extracted from the fact pattern. The facts of Segura pass this test. The facts of
Strieff do not.
Justice Thomas’s overly narrow interpretation of “but for” causation leads
and relates to the second possible mistake the Justice may have made. In placing
great weight on the warrant for Mr. Strieff’s arrest as the intervening (and therefore
attenuating) event, the majority opinion suggests that a harm, injury, or event has
only one “but for” cause. In other words, the exclusive but-for cause of the discovery
of the drugs and paraphernalia on Mr. Strieff was either the illegal stop or the valid
warrant, with the majority determining it was the latter. But “[a]s both tort law and
common sense tell us, there may by multiple but-for causes of a single loss and each,
as a but-for cause, may be responsible for the entire loss in the sense that had that
party not acted as it did, there would have been no loss.” 64 But-for causation does
not mean “sole causation, i.e., ‘standing alone.’” 65 Instead, “but-for causation
broadly defines causation, requiring only an act or omission without which the event
would not have occurred.” 66 That multiple but-for causes can exist is widely accepted

64. Loughman v. Consol-Penn. Coal Co., 6 F.3d 88, 106 (3d. Cir. 1983) (civil fraud action).
65. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Sandersville R.R. Co., No. 5:15-CV-247 (MTT), 2016 WL 5662040, at *9
(M.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2016).
66. Id.
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among courts and has been applied in a variety of case types. 67 This acceptance
extends to criminal cases. 68
The Fifth Circuit’s acceptance of the multiple but-for causes concept in a
recent criminal case shows just how misguided is the Strieff opinion. In United States
v. Ruiz-Hernandez, the defendant was convicted at trial of conspiring to bring in,
transport, and harbor a foreign person within the United States in a manner that
resulted in death, and a substantive count of transporting a foreign person into the
United States for financial gain. 69 The story behind the conviction was that Mr. RuizHernandez assisted in the smuggling of Ms. Patricia Cervantes, a Mexican citizen,
from Mexico into the United States, first by boat across the Rio Grande River,
followed by a nighttime swim across a ship channel in Brownsville, Texas. 70 While
67. See Univ. of Tex. S. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 383 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(Title VII retaliation case) (“When an event is ‘overdetermined,’ i.e., when two forces create an injury
each alone would be sufficient to cause, modern tort law permits the plaintiff to prevail upon showing that
either sufficient condition created the harm.”); Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, at 846 n.5 (2d
Cir. 2013) (Title VII discrimination and retaliation case) (“However, a plaintiff’s injury can have multiple
‘but-for’ causes, each one of which may be sufficient to support liability.”); Wilcox v. Homestake Mining
Co., 619 F.3d 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 2010) (Lucero, J., concurring) (civil action under Price-Anderson
Act) (“[T]here can be multiple but-for causes of a plaintiff’s injury.”); Evanston Insur. Co., 2016 WL
5662040, at *9 (negligence action under the Federal Employees Liability Act) (“Sandersville Railroad
mistakenly reads but-for causation to mean sole causation, i.e., ‘standing alone.’ It does not.”); Geras v.
Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 149 F. Supp. 3d 300, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (employment discrimination
and retaliation case) (“However, ‘[r]equiring proof that a prohibited consideration was a ‘but-for’ cause
of an adverse action does not equate to a burden that such consideration was the ‘sole’ cause.’”) (quoting
Kwan, 737 F.3d at 846 n.5); Isaacs v. Felder Servs., LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1194 (M.D. Ala. 2015)
(Title VII gender discrimination case) (“There may be multiple wrongful, actionable but-for causes of a
termination.”); Amusement Indus., Inc. v. Stern, 786 F. Supp. 2d 758, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (civil fraud
case) (“As case law notes, there can be ‘multiple “but-for” causes of varying degrees of directness. . . .’”)
(quoting Zito v. Leasecomm Corp., No. 02 Civ.8074(GEL), 2003 WL 22251352, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 2003)); Zito, 2003 WL 22251352, at *19 (insurance coverage dispute) (“Thus, the ‘but-for’ causation
requirement is satisfied whether or not the enticement to sign them is considered the more direct cause.
Put another way, there can be multiple ‘but-for’ causes of varying degrees of directness. . . .”); see also
United States v. Snider, 180 F. Supp. 3d 780, 787 (D.Or. 2016) (In discussing the but-for causation
requirement for proving a defendant’s drug distribution conduct resulted in the death or serious injury of
a victim under 21 U.S.C. § 841, the court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court left open the possibility that
this [but-for] requirement might also be satisfied ‘when multiple sufficient causes independently, but
concurrently produce a result.’”) (quoting Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 214 (2014)).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz-Hernandez, 890 F.3d 202, 212–13 (5th Cir. 2018) (“But-for
causation exists if the result would not have occurred without the conduct at issue. A particular result can
be caused my multiple necessary factors–multiple but-for causes–yet one of those single factors will still
be considered a but-for cause so long as the result would not have occurred in its absence.”) (citation
omitted). Moreover, recent cases involving the “resulting in death or serious injury provisions” of 21
U.S.C. § 841 reflect the growing acceptance of multiple but-for causes by the courts in criminal cases.
The criminal statute requires mandatory minimum sentences of various lengths, such as twenty years, if
“death or serious bodily injury results from” the use of the particular drug distributed by the defendant.
What level of causation is required by the statute’s “resulting from” language was resolved by Burrage.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia rejected the government’s plea for a “substantial” or “contributing”
factor causation standard in favor of the but-for standard. Burrage, 571 U.S. at 218. Following this pivotal
decision, courts have noted that the opinion “left open the possibility that this [but-for] requirement might
also be satisfied ‘when multiple sufficient causes independently, but concurrently produce a result.’”
Snider, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 787 (quoting Burrage, 571 U.S. at 214).
69. 890 F.3d 202, 202 (2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 278 (2018).
70. Id. at 206.
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swimming across the ship channel, “Ms. Cervantes was struck by a passing Coast
Guard vessel and [was] killed.” 71
In convicting Mr. Ruiz-Hernandez, the jury, by way of a special
interrogatory, found that the conspiracy and the substantive transportation counts
both resulted in the death of Ms. Cervantes. 72 The jury’s special finding had two
sentencing effects. First, it increased the statutory maximum sentence to life
imprisonment or death. 73 Second, it triggered a 10-level increase in Mr. RuizHernandez’s sentencing guidelines offense level, pursuant to United States
Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.1(b)(7), for conduct resulting in death. 74
As part of his appeal, Mr. Ruiz-Hernandez argued that the lower court erred
in applying the 10-level resulting in death enhancement. He did not dispute that
“resulting in death” under § 2L1.1(b)(7) “requires only that a defendant’s conduct be
the but-for, not proximate, cause of the resulting death.” 75 Rather, Mr. RuizHernandez’s argued that the “Coast Guard vessel [that struck Ms. Cervantes], and
not his conduct, was the but-for cause of Cervantes’s death.” 76 The Fifth Circuit
soundly rejected this argument. Citing Burrage, the appellate court affirmed the
foundation that “[b]ut-for causation exits if the result would not have occurred
without the conduct at issue.” 77 Then, important for the purposes of this article, the
Fifth Circuit explained that “[a] particular result can be caused by multiple necessary
factors–multiple but-for causes–yet one of those single factors will still be
considered a but-for cause so long as the result would not have occurred in its
absence.” 78 In applying this broad view of but-for causation, the appellate court
affirmed the lower court’s imposition of the 10-level enhancement because “while
the Coast Guard ship was a but-for cause of Cervantes’s death, she would not have
been in its path but for Ruiz-Hernandez’s conduct in smuggling her across the ship
channel. Accordingly, his conduct was also a but-for cause of her death . . . . ” 79
The majority’s opinion in Strieff collapses under the broad but-for causation
view endorsed by Segura and applied in Ruiz-Hernandez. While the arrest warrant
was a but-for cause of the discovery of the drug evidence on Mr. Strieff’s person,
Mr. Strieff would not have been arrested on the warrant and searched that day butfor the unlawful stop. In fact, the illegal stop directly led to Detective Fackrell
gaining the information that allowed him to run a warrant check, i.e. Mr. Strieff’s
name. Absent receiving Mr. Strieff’s name, Detective Fackrell would not have had
the means to run a warrant check. There is a continuous (and unbroken) but-for
causation chain from the illegal government conduct to the discovery of Mr. Strieff’s
name to the discovery of the warrant to the discovery of the drug evidence.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 210 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iv)).
Id. at 208.
Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 212–13.
Id. at 213.
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In the full-light of Segura, the Strieff majority’s analogizing of the two cases
“is difficult to understand.” 80 Detective Fackrell’s conduct with Mr. Strieff in no way
parallels the conduct of the agents in Segura. Justice Sotomayor sagaciously
summarized the material dissimilarities:
In Segura, the agents’ illegal conduct in entering the apartment
had nothing to do with their procurement of a search warrant.
Here, [Officer Fackrell’s] illegal conduct in stopping Strieff was
essential to his discovery of an arrest warrant. Segura would be
similar only if the agents used information they illegally obtained
from the apartment to procure a search warrant or discover an
arrest warrant. Precisely because that was not the case, the Court
admitted the untainted evidence [in Segura]. 81
As Justice Sotomayor recognized, the factual gap between the two
situations is too broad and wide for Segura to sanitize Detective Fackrell’s violation
of Mr. Strieff’s rights. Every action and discovery by Detective Fackrell sprung from
his unlawful stop of Mr. Strieff. Take away Detective Fackrell’s unlawful conduct
and Mr. Strieff is a free man today.
In sum, Segura supports suppression of the drug evidence in Strieff, not
admission. The facts of Strieff do not fulfill two of Segura’s key requirements for
triggering the attenuation doctrine: that Detective Fackrell knew of the probable
cause supporting the arrest warrant prior to stopping Mr. Strieff, and that the illegal
stop of Mr. Strieff was not a but-for cause of the discovery of the drug evidence.
These requirements are not acknowledged, and certainly not addressed, by Justice
Thomas even though he places great weight on Segura’s “suggest[ion] that the
existence of a valid warrant favors finding that the connection between unlawful [law
enforcement] conduct and the discovery of evidence is ‘sufficiently attenuated to
dissipate the taint.’” 82 This is precedent cherry-picking at its worst. The majority
opinion distorts Segura from being a case that actually supports suppression under
the facts of Strieff into the key cog in the legal justification and cover for dragnet
policing. As discussed next, invariably those who will disproportionately suffer
under this police tactic are people of color, particularly those living in the
economically disadvantaged parts of our cities.
IV. BALTIMORE AND HOW STRIEFF INCREASES AND ENCOURAGES
RACIALLY TARGETED DRAGNET POLICING
The Strieff majority found that the Brown test’s third factor (purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct) “strongly favors the State” because Detective
Fackrell made “good-faith mistakes” that were “at most negligent.” 83 In doing so,
the majority summarily shrugs-off any concern that their opinion will open the door
to dragnet stops and searches by police, particularly in jurisdictions where
80.
81.
82.
83.

Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2067 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2062 (quoting Segura v. United States, 486 U.S. 815 (1984)).
Id. at 2063.
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outstanding arrest warrants are prevalent. 84 According to Justice Thomas, such
conduct by police is “unlikely” and is deterred by the potential of civil liability. 85
Justice Thomas and the majority’s quick dismissal of Detective Fackrell’s
“negligence” and the wide-spread and deep impact of the majority opinion is not
only callous and out of touch with the reality of policing in many urban and
impoverished communities, but it also fails to recognize how the opinion encourages
dragnet policing, including racially targeted dragnet policing, without fear of
liability, civil or otherwise.
As Justice Sotomayor reminds (or rather educates) the majority,
“[o]utstanding warrants are surprisingly common,” and are issued even for minor
infractions, such as traffic violations, failing to pay a traffic ticket, or drinking
alcohol while on probation. 86 Indeed, there were over 7.8 million warrants in state
and the federal government databases at the time of the opinion’s announcement,
with “the vast majority of which appear to be for minor offenses.” 87 Justice
Sotomayor also points out that even before Strieff, warrant checks have been the
foundation of dragnet policing in a St. Louis, Missouri and Newark, New Jersey. 88
St. Louis and Newark, however, are not alone in police using warrant
checks to conduct dragnet policing. In fact, the Supreme Court need only look 40
miles to the northeast to understand that dragnet policing is a daily reality for black
people in our cities, and that the judiciary’s continued endorsement of such policing
fuels public discontent that eventually blows over into civil unrest.
A.

Story of Two Baltimores

With its population of about 621,000 residents, Baltimore is Maryland’s the
largest city. 89 Baltimore is a majority black city with blacks constituting
approximately 63 percent of the population, followed by a distant 30 percent white,
and 4 percent Latino. 90 Looking from the outside at a high level, Baltimore appears
to prosper economically. The city ranks seventh among the thirty-five largest
metropolitan areas in terms of per capita income (at about $54,457), and jobs in the
city pay better than the national average ($58,091 compared to the national average
of $49,808 as of 2013). 91 The city is home to educational beacons such as Johns
Hopkins University, Morgan State University (one of country’s oldest historically
black universities), Loyola University, and the University of Maryland School of
Law. The city’s Johns Hopkins Hospital is one of the world’s foremost teaching

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id. at 2064.
Id.
Id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id. at 2068–69.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT 12 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [hereinafter BPD DOJ
REPORT].
90. Id.
91. Alan Berube & Brad McDearman, Good Fortune, Dire Poverty, and Inequality in Baltimore: An
American Story, BROOKINGS: THE AVENUE (May 11, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/theavenue/2015/05/11/good-fortune-dire-poverty-and-inequality-in-baltimore-an-american-story/
[https://perma.cc/XHG6-3V6H].
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hospitals and medical research facilities. The city’s Inner Harbor is a tourism hub
that features the Maryland Science Center and the famous National Aquarium
alongside a bustling complex of restaurants, retailers, and music venues.
A closer look, however, reveals that what exists today are really two
Baltimores – one that is affluent and mostly white (with a growing black middle
class), and another that is overwhelmingly black and poor. The predominately-black
neighborhoods that sit directly west and east of downtown Baltimore exhibit high
rates of poverty and suffer the expected collateral consequences of poverty. Take for
instance Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park, an overwhelmingly black
neighborhood in West Baltimore. The neighborhood has one of the lowest median
incomes in the city at $24,006. 92 One in four of the neighborhood’s residents receive
public assistance benefits compared to one in nine residents for the whole city. 93 One
in three (thirty-three percent) of the neighborhood’s houses are vacant or abandoned,
which is well over the rate of one in twelve (eight percent) for the city as a whole. 94
More than one-fifth of Sandtown- Winchester/Harlem Park’s working-age residents
are unemployed, and with three percent of the neighborhood’s population
incarcerated, Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park has more people in prison than any
other Baltimore neighborhood. 95 The life expectancy of a resident of SandtownWinchester/Harlem Park is 69.7 years, compared to 84.4 years for a resident of
Roland Park, a majority white Baltimore neighborhood. 96 The respective infant
mortality rates (per 1,000 births) for two neighborhoods is 9.7 for SandtownWinchester/Harlem Park versus 3.4 for Roland Park. 97
Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park is not unique in how poverty and the
resulting consequences break largely along racial lines in Baltimore. Indeed, to be
born black and poor in Baltimore City is to be born into a life of poverty so crippling
that it impedes and severely limits nearly every aspect of life – education, job
opportunities, and lifespan, to name a few. This is the reality even though Maryland
is one of the wealthiest states in the country. 98 Indeed, nearly 25% of Maryland’s
poor live in Baltimore City, even though the city comprises 11% of the state’s total
population, 99 and black Baltimoreans account for more than 75% of city’s residents
living in poverty. 100 The median income for black households in Baltimore is

92. JUSTICE POLICY INST. & PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, THE RIGHT INVESTMENT? CORRECTIONS
SPENDING
IN
BALTIMORE
CITY
19
(2015),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/rightinvestment_design_2.23.15_final.pd
f.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Jeremy Ashkenas et al., A Portrait of the Sandtown Neighborhood in Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES
(May 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/05/03/us/a-portrait-of-the-sandtownneighborhood-in-baltimore.html [https://perma.cc/BGF4-CB2N].
96. MARYLAND DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERV., OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, HISTORY, PUBLIC
POLICY, AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF POVERTY: UNDERSTANDING CHALLENGES FACING BALTIMORE CITY
AND MARYLAND 37 (2016), http://dlslibrary.state.md.us/publications/opa/i/hppgp_2016.pdf.
97. Id.
98. Jordan Malter, Baltimore’s Economy in Black and White, CNN BUSINESS (Apr. 29, 2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/29/news/economy/baltimore-economy/ [https://perma.cc/C2RB-MZ9Z].
99. MARYLAND DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERV., OFF. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS, supra note 96, at 3.
100. BPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 89, at 14.
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$33,610, which is slightly higher than half the median income for white households
in the city ($60,550), and less than half the median income of all Maryland
households ($73,538). 101 This is just a sample of the facts and statistics that show
that the birthright of the black poor Baltimorean is extreme poverty, imprisonment,
and early death. 102
In short, “[b]y a wide range of metrics – income, employment, education –
the racial divide in Baltimore is wider than in the U.S. as a whole.” 103 There are
numerous causes for this racial divergence. The failings of the education system in
the city’s poor black neighborhoods dove-tailed with the decline in the number of
jobs located in the city, particularly jobs requiring less skill and education. 104 But a
changing economy is only part of the story. More impactful has been Baltimore’s
long history of private and government-supported discrimination. Take housing for
example, where discriminatory practices, such as red-lining, have established,
maintained, and regulated segregation in Baltimore and confined black city residents
largely to the poorest (in wealth, education, jobs, and health) parts of the city for
decades. 105

101. Malter, supra note 98.
102. For example, between 2000 and 2010, the median income of white households in Baltimore
increased by 30%, whereas the median income of black households decreased by 10%. MARYLAND DEP’T
OF LEGISLATIVE SERV., OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 96, at 3. Baltimore’s three
neighborhoods with the highest average poverty rate within the past twenty-five years (average of about
60%) are primarily populated by black residents. Id. at 34 (identifying the neighborhoods of
Oldtown/Middle East, Cherry Hill, and Upton/Druid Hill). Unemployment rate for black men in Baltimore
between ages twenty and twenty-four was 37% in 2013, compared to 10% for white men. Ben Casselman,
How Baltimore’s Young Black Men Are Boxed In, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 28, 2015),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-baltimores-young-black-men-are-boxed-in/
[https://perma.cc/93SV-VP7X]. An estimated 41% of the city’s black children live in poverty, compared
to just 13.7% of the city’s white children. Berube & McDearman, supra note 91.
103. Casselman, supra note 102.
104. See MARYLAND DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERV., OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 96, at
22.
105. For a poignant and arresting account of how such practices subjected black Americans to decades
(if not a lifetime) of de facto segregation and all the negative effects that flow from it, see Ta-Nehisi
ATLANTIC
(June
2014),
Coates,
The
Case
for
Reparations,
THE
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/
[https://perma.cc/F46E-L2WD]. For how redlining and other racist practices and government policies
have resulted in persistent racial segregation and poverty in Baltimore in particular, see Emily Badger,
The Long, Painful and Repetitive History of How Baltimore Became Baltimore, WASH. POST (Apr. 29,
2015), washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/04/29/the-long-painful-and-repetitive-history-of-howbaltimore-became-baltimore/; Laura Bliss, After Nearly a Century, Redlining Still Divides Baltimore,
CITYLAB (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2015/04/after-nearly-a-century-redlining-stilldivides-baltimore/391982/ [https://perma.cc/ML5J-ZLK8]; Jamelle Bouie, The Deep, Troubling Roots of
Baltimore’s Decline, SLATE (Apr. 29, 2015), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/04/baltimoresfailure-is-rooted-in-its-segregationist-past-the-citys-black-community-has-never-recovered.html
[https://perma.cc/3UGG-RXBM]; Justin George & Mark Puente, Baltimore Leaders Agree: City Has a
Race Problem, BALT. SUN (Mar. 14, 2015), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-city/bsmd-ci-baltimore-racism-20150314-story.html [https://perma.cc/325W-X94F]; see also NAT’L CMTY.
REINVESTMENT COAL. (NCRC), HOME MORTGAGE AND SMALL BUSINESS LENDING IN BALTIMORE AND
SURROUNDING AREAS 9 (2015), https://ncrc.org/home-mortgage-and-small-business-lending-inbaltimore-and-surrounding-areas/ [https://perma.cc/U7JH-GDUC] (finding that race plays a significant
factor in mortgage lending in Baltimore City and the surrounding counties).
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As the city’s former police commissioner publicly admitted, Baltimore is
still “dealing with 1950’s-level black-and-white racism.” 106 Indeed, the statistics
cited earlier, “make perfect sense in the context of the century-long assault that
Baltimore’s blacks have endured at the hands of local, state and federal policy
makers, all of whom worked to quarantine black residents in ghettos, making it
difficult even for people of means to move into integrated areas that offered better
jobs, schools and lives for the children.” 107 Although Baltimore is not the only city
to suffer from a long history of racist government policies and tendencies, as the New
York Times editorial board recently acknowledged, “the segregationist impulse in
Maryland generally was particularly virulent and well-documented in Baltimore.” 108
Which leads us to today, where the “two Baltimores have mostly gone
unreconciled.” 109
B.

Baltimore’s Recent History of Racially Targeted Dragnet Policing

Certainly, the law-abiding residents of Baltimore want and welcome
policing. They want safe streets for their families, to feel secure in their homes, and
to go about their lives without being robbed, assaulted, or killed. However, the
manner in which policing occurs is just as important as the level of policing. It is
under the former metric that the Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”) has
historically failed and continues to do so when it comes to the city’s poorer and
majority-black neighborhoods. This is made abundantly clear by the 2016 Findings
Report on the Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department by the Civil
Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice (hereinafter the “BPD
DOJ Report”). 110
The Civil Rights Division opened a formal investigation into the BPD on
May 8, 2015, less than a month after city-wide protests and riots erupted after Freddie
Gray, a 26-year old black man, died from injuries he sustained during his arrest by
BPD officers. 111 The investigation lasted 14 months and culminated in an report that
was published to the public on August 10, 2016. Overall the investigation found that:
BPD’s practices perpetuate and fuel a multitude of issues rooted
in poverty and race, focusing law enforcement actions on lowincome, minority communities in a manner that is often
unnecessary and unproductive. In other words, BPD’s law

106. Justin Fenton, Batts Elaborates on Comments that Baltimore Suffers from ‘1950s Racism’, BALT.
SUN (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bal-batts-elaborates-on-comments-thatbaltimore-suffers-from-1950s-racism-20150228-story.html [https://perma.cc/YWP9-68L5].
107. Editorial Board, How Racism Doomed Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/opinion/sunday/how-racism-doomed-baltimore.html
[https://perma.cc/7VSG-TWYJ].
108. Id.
109. Michael A. Fletcher, What You Really Need to Know About Baltimore, from a Reporter Who’s
POST
(Apr.
28,
2015),
Lived
There
for
Over
30
Years,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/04/28/what-you-really-need-to-know-aboutbaltimore-from-a-reporter-who-lived-there-for-30-years/ [https://perma.cc/D9D2-A37D].
110. See generally BPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 89.
111. Id. at 19–20.
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enforcement practices at times exacerbate the longstanding
structural inequalities in the City by encouraging officers to have
unnecessary, adversarial interactions with community members
that increase exposure to the criminal justice system and fail to
improve public safety. 112
Specifically, the federal civil rights investigators concluded that BPD
engages in the following unconstitutional and unlawful practices: “(1) making
unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests; (2) using enforcement strategies that
produce severe and unjustified disparities in the rates of stops, searches and arrests
of African Americans; (3) using excessive force; and (4) retaliating against people
engaging in constitutionally-protected expression.” 113 This is a longer and eloquent
way to say that BPD engages in dragnet policing targeting blacks in the city, and
such policing puts black lives and limbs in peril with little to no consequences for
offending officers. 114
There is much in the BPD DOJ report that could (and should) be discussed
concerning the existence, form, and prevalence of racially targeted dragnet policing
by the BPD and the community harm it causes. But for the purposes here – exposing
the disconnect between the words and rationale of Justice Thomas’s Strieff opinion
and the reality of today’s policing in urban, minority-majority neighborhoods – this
article focuses on two of the federal investigator’s conclusions about the BPD.
The first is the DOJ’s conclusion that the data revealed a “widespread
pattern of BPD officers stopping and detaining people on Baltimore streets without
reasonable suspicion that they are involved in criminal activity.” 115 More
specifically, the federal investigators found that BPD officers “routinely violate” the
standards set by Terry v. Ohio 116 for police to briefly detain a person for an
investigation by “detaining and questioning individuals who are sitting, standing, or
walking in public areas, even where officers have no basis to suspect them of
wrongdoing.” 117 This conclusion was derived, in part, from data showing the
“extremely low rate” at which BPD’s pedestrian stops uncovered criminal activity. 118
Among a reviewed sample of 7,200 pedestrian stops, only 271 stops (3.7%), resulted
in BPD officers issuing a criminal citation or arrest. 119 This translates to BPD officers

112. Id. at 20.
113. Id. at 3.
114. The investigation behind these conclusions was extensive and thorough. It involved interviewing
the then-current BPD commissioner, former commissioners, current and former BPD officers, leaders of
the local police union, hundreds of Baltimore residents, and numerous local community, advocacy, and
neighborhood groups. Id. at 4. In addition to the interviews, the investigators reviewed “hundreds of
thousands of pages of documents,” including BPD policy and training manuals, internal affairs files, and
data on stops, arrests, and uses of deadly and non-deadly force by officers. Id.
115. Id. at 27.
116. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that police officers may briefly detain an individual for an
investigation where the officers possess reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal
activity).
117. BPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 89, at 28.
118. See id.
119. Id.
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finding and charging criminal activity in only one out of every 27 pedestrian stops. 120
“Such low ‘hit rates’ are a strong indication that [BPD] officers make stops based on
a threshold of suspicion that falls below constitutional requirements.” 121
Frequent pedestrian stops, the federal investigators learned, was a policing
tactic that is encouraged, even ordered, by BPD supervisors and management,
despite the ineffectiveness of the tactic in uncovering evidence of crimes. 122 Not only
did BPD supervising officers not hide their use of pedestrian stops based on
questionable and non-existing reasonable suspicion from DOJ investigators, they
openly demonstrated their embrace of the tactic. In one account, contained in the
BPD DOJ Report, during a ride-along with DOJ investigators, a BPD sergeant
instructed a patrol officer to “make something up” as a basis to stop and question a
group of young black males standing on a street corner doing nothing suspicious. 123
Over the course of their investigation, the federal investigators found that “[t]his
incident [was] far from anomalous.” 124
Important for the purposes of this article, the DOJ investigators found that
“[m]any of the unlawful stops . . . appear motivated at least in part by officers’ desire
to check whether the stopped individuals have outstanding warrants that would allow
officers to make an arrest or search individuals in hopes of finding illegal firearm or
narcotics.” 125 Such a finding further shows the emptiness of Justice Thomas’s
assurance that it is “unlikely” that his opinion will encourage dragnet stops and
searches. 126 It also fortifies Justice Sotomayor’s warning that Mr. Strieff’s case will
not be an isolated incident because the majority opinion provides law enforcement
another tool “to target pedestrians in an arbitrary manner” and to treat certain
“members of our communities as second-class citizens.” 127
The related and second conclusion of the DOJ investigators of focus here is
that the BPD uses “enforcement strategies that produce severe and unjustified
disparities
in
the
rates
of
stops . . . of African Americans.” 128 Or stated another way, “BPD disproportionately
stops African Americans standing, walking, or driving on Baltimore streets.” 129 The
statistical data was too “overwhelming” to conclude otherwise:
The Department’s data on all pedestrian stops from January 2010
to June 2015 shows that African Americans account for 84 percent
of stops despite comprising only 63 percent of the City’s
population. Expressed differently, BPD officers made 520 stops

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 28–29.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 28.
See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016).
Id. at 2068–69,
BPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 89, at 3.
Id. at 48.
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for every 1,000 black residents in Baltimore, but only 180 stops
for every 1,000 Caucasian residents. 130
The data also showed that the BPD uses pedestrian stops as a policing tactic
disproportionately in the city’s black neighborhoods. Of the recorded pedestrian
stops from January 2010 through June 2015, 44 percent occurred in two of the city’s
majority black districts that contain just 11 percent of the city’s population. 131 But
blacks living, working, or just being present in other districts, including black
minority districts, are not immune to the being targeted by BPD officers for
pedestrian stops. “Indeed, the proportion of African-American stops exceeds the
share of African-American population in each of the BPD’s nine police districts,
despite significant variations in the districts’ racial, socioeconomic, and geographic
composition.” 132 For example, in the Central District, which includes the city’s
downtown business area, blacks accounted for 83 percent of the pedestrian stops
during the reviewed time period, while constituting a distant fifty-seven percent of
the district’s population. 133 In the mostly suburban and affluent Northern District,
blacks accounted for eighty-three percent of the stops, which was more than double
their constitution of the district’s population (forty-one percent). 134 And in the
Southeast District, where blacks constitute only twenty-three percent of the
population, two out of three BPD pedestrian stops involved black subjects. 135
When the federal investigators looked closer at the pedestrian stop data,
they found that not only are black Baltimoreans disproportionately subjected to BPD
pedestrian stops, but that they “are far more likely to be subjected to multiple stops
within relatively short periods of time.” 136 As explained in the report:
African Americans accounted for 95 percent of the 410
individuals stopped at least ten times by BPD officers from 2010–
2015. During this period, BPD stopped 34 African Americans at
least 20 times and seven other African Americans at least 30
times. No person of any other race was stopped more than 12
times. One African-American man in his mid-fifties was stopped
30 times in less than four years. The only reasons provided for
these stops were officers’ suspicion that the man was “loitering”
or “trespassing,” or as part of a “CDS investigation.” On at least
15 occasions, officers detained the man while they checked to see
if he had outstanding warrants. Despite these repeated intrusions,
none of the 30 stops resulted in a citation or criminal charge. 137

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
Id. (footnote omitted).
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The data showing the BPD’s use of pedestrian stops led federal
investigators to the unavoidable conclusion that “BPD’s disproportionate
enforcement may constitute intentional discrimination.” 138 According to the
investigators, the “consistent racial disparities” could not be explained by more
benign factors such as “population patterns, crime rates, or other race-neutral
factors.” 139 The explanation tilted more towards intentional and invidious
discrimination “because the racial disparities are greatest for enforcement activities
that involve higher degrees of officer discretion.” 140 Simply put, the data-proven
disparities provide substantial evidence that pedestrian stops (along with searches
and arrests of blacks in the city) “are not part of a calibrated, proportionate strategy
for responding to criminal activity,” but rather intentional, purposeful, and
sanctioned discrimination by the BPD. 141
The existence of racial disparities in pedestrian stops has important
implications for the thesis here: that Strieff encourages and judicially insulates
racially targeted dragnet policing of our cities. Racial disparities in pedestrian stops
(particularly those involving warrant checks) cannot be divorced from the racial
disparities and discrimination in the policing that leads to warrants. It is a mutually
dependent situation. If there is racial discrimination in the policing that leads to
arrests and the lodging of warrants, then the discriminatory and unconstitutional
stops will be sanitized (because of Strieff) by the warrants that come from the same
well of discrimination.
Baltimore is a perfect example. As the DOJ investigators found when
reviewing BPD data from November 2010 through July 2015, black Baltimoreans
accounted for 86 percent of all criminal offenses charged by BPD officers even
though they constitute 63 percent of Baltimore’s population. 142 When compared to
the arrest rates of residents of other races, black Baltimoreans were charged at a rate
of one criminal offense per 1.4 resident, while other races were charged at rate of
one criminal offense per 5.1 residents. 143 The disparities, according to the federal
investigators, were not explained by race-neutral factors (such as population patterns
or crime rates) or by legitimate law enforcement objectives. Rather, the data led the
DOJ to conclude that the disparities were the result of racially-discriminatory police
tactics, such as arresting blacks for misdemeanor offenses based on low evidentiary
thresholds, and over-policing of blacks for drug-related offenses. 144
It is a simple path: racially discriminatory policing leads to a
disproportionate number of arrests and misdemeanor citations involving people of
color, which leads to a disproportionate number of warrants being lodged against
people of color, which leads to a disproportionate number of baseless and
unconstitutional stops of people of color being sanitized by Strieff. Baltimore
evidences this path, but it is not alone in doing so. For example, in Ferguson,
138. Id. at 63. This conclusion was also based on the investigators’ review of data concerning BPD’s
searches and arrests practices.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 64.
141. Id. at 61–62.
142. Id. at 7.
143. Id. at 55.
144. Id. at 64.
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Missouri, as DOJ investigators discovered when reviewing the Ferguson Police
Department’s (“FPD”) practices from 2012 through 2014, blacks constituted 67 %
of the city’s population, but accounted for “85 % of vehicle stops, 90 % of citations,
and 93 % of arrests by FPD officers.” 145 After reviewing and investigating the data,
the federal investigators concluded that “Ferguson’s approach to law enforcement
both reflects and reinforces racial bias,” and that the racial disparities present within
the FPD’s data on arrests, citations, stops, and searches provided ample evidence that
the disparities are “due in part to intentional discrimination on the basis of race.” 146
In sum, in an environment such as Baltimore, where racially-discriminatory
policing has not only been allowed but encouraged, it is easy to see how Strieff will
make it worse for those at the receiving end of the discrimination. Indeed, as federal
investigators found in Baltimore, BPD officers conducted warrant checks in 73
percent of all pedestrian stops 147 and routinely stopped people, mostly black people,
on fishing expeditions for warrants before the Strieff decision. 148 Now that the
Supreme Court has blessed the practice, BPD officers have more license and
incentive to engage in baseless fishing expedition stops. As of January 2017, there
were an estimated 35,000 active warrants in Baltimore, which included about 6,800
outstanding warrants for people who missed court dates for non-violent
misdemeanors. 149 As a result of Strieff, BPD officers are now armed with thousands
of justifications for engaging in dragnet pedestrian stops for reasons falling far short
of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. With the city’s recent history as a guide,
it is clear that black Baltimoreans will continue to overwhelmingly and
disproportionately bear the brunt of this practice that is sure to expand post-Strieff.
V. JUST A FANTASY: JUSTICE THOMAS’S CLAIM THAT
CIVIL LIABILITY IS A SUFFICIENT DETERRENT AGAINST
RACIALLY TARGETED DRAGENT POLICING
As just shown, Justice Thomas’s claim that it is “unlikely” that his opinion
will open the flood gates to police engaging in dragnet stops in search of warrants
ignores what was happening to black people in cities before Strieff made the practice
more attractive and judicially protected. The other half of his claim — that civil

145. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT
4
(2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. The investigation was initiated
in large part to the shooting death of Michael Brown, an 18 year-old black resident of the city, by a white
police officer (Darren Wilson) on August 9, 2014, and the days of protests and unrest that followed. Id. at
5. A separate civil rights investigation of the shooting found that there were insufficient grounds for
federal civil rights charges against Officer Wilson.
146. Id.
147. BPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 89, at 28 n.43.
148. Id. at 28 (“Many of the unlawful stops we identified appear motivated at least in part by officers’
desire to check whether the stopped individuals have outstanding warrants that would allow officers to
make an arrest or search individuals in hopes of finding illegal firearms or narcotics.”).
149. Justin Fenton, Court Offers Help Clearing Warrants for Failing to Appear in Court, BALTIMORE
SUN (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-warrant-second-chance20170109-story.html [https://perma.cc/DMB4-N8U4].
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lawsuits are a deterrent and protection against “[s]uch wanton conduct” — is equally
ignorant. 150
A. Section 1983 Lawsuits Are Not An Affordable Or Viable Option
The regular vehicle for victims seeking compensation for police misconduct
is a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Section 1983 allows a person to sue
state governments, police officers, state government employees, and others acting
“under the color of” state law for committing civil rights violations. 151 Since its
enactment, Section 1983 has been instrumental in providing people harmed by
unlawful police conduct the means to have their claims heard, taken seriously, and
compensated. The law certainly does deter some unconstitutional police conduct at
the individual and institutional levels. For many reasons, this argument does not
extend to racially targeted dragnet and baseless stops now given further legal cover
by Strieff.
For starters, to claim that the specter of civil liability is a sufficient deterrent
to prevent police from abusing the dragnet policing license granted by Strieff is to
erroneously presume that those negatively (and disproportionately) affected by the
practice have the ability and means to pursue such a remedy. Pursuing a civil suit
against a police department or officer takes time and money — two commodities that
many in the inner city who are affected by dragnet warrant fishing expeditions do
not have in abundance. The financial costs of pursuing a lawsuit for an
unconstitutional pedestrian stop — retaining an attorney, court fees, and lost wages
for days spent in court, depositions, and other proceedings — offer far more
deterrence to pursuing a Section 1983 lawsuit than the deterrence offered to law
enforcement by the possibility of a Section 1983 lawsuit. Regardless of economic
status, the litigation costs are barriers to seeking relief. For many of the urban poor
affected by dragnet policing deterrence is unaffordable.
This leads to the second reason that Section 1983 lawsuits will not deter
police officers from conducting racially targeted fishing expedition stops without
legal justification: dubious damages. The harm caused by a suspicionless, fishingexpedition stop that did not lead to an arrest is “difficult to quantify in financial
terms.” 152 Without an arrest or detention, any physical or mental harm caused by a
baseless stop that lasts only minutes may appear fleeting to many juries, and
therefore result in only nominal damages. 153 For most potential plaintiffs, the
likelihood of nominal damages is too much a Pyrrhic victory when balanced against
the expense, time, and emotional commitment to pursue a Section 1983 lawsuit for
a baseless stop. Nominal damages are a disincentive to plaintiff attorneys as well. 154
The likelihood that only nominal damages await at the end of a Section 1983 lawsuit

150. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
152. Katherine A. Macfarlane, Predicting Utah v. Strieff’s Civil Rights Impact, 126 YALE L. J. F. 139,
144 (2016) (quoting Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 432 (2012)).
153. See id. at 144–45.
154. See id. at 146 (“The availability of attorneys’ fees does not necessarily make Strieff-like cases
attractive [to attorneys]. To obtain attorneys’ fees, a civil rights plaintiff must prevail.”).
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based on a suspicionless and racially motivated stop provides even more deterrence
against filing of a lawsuit.
The law also provides a significant obstacle to pursuing a Section 1983
claim — qualified immunity for officers. In Section 1983 cases, the “doctrine of
qualified immunity prevents government agents from being held personally liable
for constitutional violations unless the violation was of ‘clearly established law.’” 155
According to the Supreme Court, the immunity protects “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” 156 The Supreme Court is not
shy in stating that that the goal of qualified immunity is “to avoid ‘subject[ing]
government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching
discovery’ in cases where the legal norms the officials are alleged to have violated
were not clearly established at the time.” 157 In keeping with this goal, qualified
immunity is judicially designed to frustrate the ability of Section 1983 plaintiffs to
pursue their claims. It can be, and often is, raised early in a Section 1983 case, so
that a plaintiff’s case is dismissed before any discovery is exchanged or taken, and
judges have the discretion to apply the immunity to dismiss a lawsuit even before it
is invoked by a Section 1983 defendant. And if by chance a claim of qualified
immunity is defeated at the trial level, Section 1983 police officer defendants have
comfort in knowing that the Supreme Court will likely rescue them. The Supreme
Court “dedicates an outsized portion of its docket to reviewing—and virtually always
reversing—denials of qualified immunity in the lower courts.” 158 Since 1982, the
Supreme Court has decided thirty-two qualified immunity cases and has found that
the defendant violated “clearly established law” in just two of the cases. 159 “In these
decisions, the Court regularly chides [lower] courts for denying qualified immunity
motions given the importance of the doctrine ‘to society as a whole.’” 160 With the
Supreme Court’s backing and support, qualified immunity has become an effective
and efficient obstacle to Section 1983 lawsuits based on police misconduct. Today,
it is “nearly impossible to find clearly established law that would defeat the
defense.” 161
For people seeking to show that a police department as an institution uses
unconstitutional dragnet stops as a policing tactic, the burdens (and therefore the
obstacles) are even greater and provide even more disincentives to pursue a
lawsuit. 162 As shown by the DOJ’s investigation of Baltimore (as well as Ferguson
and other cities), proving that a police department engages in widespread and

155. William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 46 (2018).
156. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
157. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982)).
158. Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1798
(2018); see also Samuel L. Bray, The Future of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1793
(2018) (“The Court issues many summary reversals in qualified immunity cases, and the effect of these
reversals is all in one direction: they protect, entrench, and extend the defense of qualified immunity.”).
159. Schwartz, supra note 158, at 1798 n.2.
160. Id. at 1798 (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551-52 (2017)).
161. Id. For more on qualified immunity, its history, and how it frustrates Section 1983 claims, see,
e.g., Baude, supra note 155.
162. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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institutional misconduct is an onerous effort requiring significant resources and time.
To reach their findings that the BPD engages in unconstitutional policing, DOJ
investigators “reviewed hundreds of thousands of pages of [BPD] documents”
including years of training materials, internal affairs files, pedestrian and vehicle stop
data, arrest data, incident reports, deadly force reports, and investigation files. 163 The
investigators also interviewed city leaders, current and formed BPD commissioners,
current and former BPD officers, the police union’s leadership, and “hundreds of
people in the broader Baltimore community.” 164 The federal investigators were
“assisted by a dozen current and former law enforcement leaders and experts with
experience on the issues” as well as “statistical experts to analyze BPD’s data on its
enforcement activities.” 165 It is unreasonable to expect the average citizen who seeks
to challenge, bring to light, and seek redress from dragnet policing misconduct to be
able to marshal comparable resources, receive the same level of cooperation from a
police department and city leaders, and have the same access to police data and
documents. Yet, that is what it takes to demonstrate the “systemic or recurrent police
misconduct” Strieff expects and demands, and Justice Thomas fails to provide a less
burdensome and resource intensive alternative. 166
B. How Baltimore Exposes Justice Thomas’s Deterrence Claim as Fantasy
Justice Thomas’s claim that civil liability provides a sufficient deterrence
against dragnet policing abuse wrongly presumes that the systems in place to police
the police will provide the necessary means, i.e., process and evidence, to allow such
civil lawsuits to proceed and be successful. For Justice Thomas’s deterrence effect
to be realized, there must be a process that facilitates a civilian pursuing a claim of
improper policing. This process starts with the police department itself. A
department must have accessible means for a civilian to bring attention to improper
policing and for such claims to be taken seriously, investigated, and acted on by the
department if the claims are substantiated. The process yields a necessity for the
successful pursuit of a civil lawsuit: evidence of police misconduct. Without
evidence of unconstitutional conduct by police — either by individual officers or
police departments as a whole — civil litigation is doomed to fail and offer no
deterrence value.
Baltimore, yet again, shows Justice Thomas’s disconnect from reality. This
time it is his presumption that police departments act counter to their self-interest
and provide a meaningful process for civilians to pursue and obtain data that can be
used in litigation to demonstrate individual or institutional malfeasance. The DOJ
BPD Report amply reveals how the reality is far different from Justice Thomas’s
view of the world. The DOJ’s review included an assessment of how the BPD
responds to civilian complaints and how the department investigates and punishes
officers for unprofessional and unconstitutional conduct. The assessment involved,

163. BPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 89, at 4.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 136 S. Ct. at 2068. Justice Sotomayor notes that Justice Thomas’s opinion fails to “offer guidance
for how a defendant can prove that his arrest was the result of ‘widespread’ misconduct.” Id. at 2069.
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in part, the DOJ reviewing the procedures and efficacy of the department’s central
accountability system: BPD’s Internal Investigation Division (IID). 167
The DOJ’s final assessment of BPD’s IID and the department’s related
systems for investigating civilian complaints and police misconduct is stark and
plain: “BPD relies on deficient accountability systems that fail to curb
unconstitutional policing.” 168 According to the federal investigators, the deficiencies
run “throughout” BPD’s accountability systems, and “undermine adherence to
BPD’s policies and procedures and contribute to the violations of federal law that
[were] found.” 169
A number of the discovered deficiencies contribute directly to the inability
of Baltimore residents to pursue civil claims against BPD officers and/or the
department, and as result put the deterrence heralded by Justice Thomas far out of
reach. For instance, the federal investigators discovered that “BPD discourages
members of the public from filing complaints against officers through the procedural
requirements BPD has imposed on filing complaints, and BPD officers and
supervisors have actively discouraged community members from filing
complaints.” 170 In other words, the BPD actively and purposefully creates barriers to
prevent the community from bringing attention to, challenging, and seeking relief
for improper police conduct.
If a complaining civilian resists the department’s efforts to discourage the
filing of a complaint, federal investigators discovered that the BPD engages in tactics
and erects other obstacles to derail a complaining civilian’s efforts to expose police
misconduct. For instance, once a complaint is filed, “BPD investigators frequently
misclassify those complaints or administratively close them with little attempt to
contact the complainant.” 171 Misclassifying complaints allows the BPD to avoid
forwarding the complaints to IID for investigation and resolution. 172 Once a civilian
complaint is accepted by the BPD (and not forwarded to IID due to intentional
misclassification), it is likely to be administratively closed by a BPD supervisor.
“Indeed, BPD supervisors administratively closed 33 percent of all allegations
received from 2010 through 2015—ensuring that the allegations would result in no
further investigation or officer discipline.” 173 These administrative closures
frequently occurred following minimal, if any, investigation. 174
In the rare occasions that civilian complaints progress to the investigation
stage “they are hampered from the start by poor investigative techniques and

167. See BPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 89, at 139 (“IID investigates and resolves complaints of officer
misconduct, both complaints received internally from other officers or BPD employees, and those
received from members of the community.”).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 140.
170. Id. Some of the procedures that created barriers to filing a complaint noted by the investigators
included requiring complaints for common types of police conduct to be notarized and filed in person in
a few select locations.
171. Id. at 141.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 142.
174. See id.
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unreasonable delays.” 175 The federal investigators discovered that basic and routine
investigation tasks—e.g., interviewing the complainants, interviewing the accused
officers, interviewing witnesses identified by the complainants, canvassing the area
where the alleged misconduct occurred for witnesses and evidence (such as
surveillance camera video)—”are frequently plagued by delays.” 176 The delays can
last up to ten months. 177 Delays undermine the investigations and weaken the
viability of a civilian’s complaint because evidence can be lost or destroyed,
witnesses are lost never to be found again, and witness memory fades. 178 In short,
the unnecessary delays “preclude[s] BPD investigators from gathering important
evidence about allegations of serious misconduct.” 179
“In addition to frequent delays that limit the information available about
misconduct allegations, poor investigative techniques further compromise BPD’s
investigations.” 180 The federal civil rights investigators identified “several key
failures” when reviewing the BPD’s techniques and procedures for investigating
police misconduct claims. “First, investigators fail to adequately consider evidence
and statements from witnesses or other officers that contradict explanations provided
by officers accused of misconduct.” 181 The DOJ found that BPD investigators had a
pro-officer bias that manifested in allowing accused officers to submit clarifying
addendums to original statements that were contradicted by witness statements or
other evidence, and discounting entirely evidence that contradicted the accused
officer’s account. 182 The bias is most pronounced in deadly force investigations. The
interviews of BPD officers involved in deadly force incidents are commonly
“conclusory and superficial,” last no longer than 10 or 15 minutes, and regularly fail
to include “critical questions about the threat they faced or their decision-making
process leading up to their [use of] deadly force.” 183 In comparison, the “BPD’s
interviews of civilian witnesses . . . often last hours, and the investigators ask
specific, probing questions, demonstrating their ability to be thorough and
exacting.” 184
The second key failure discovered by the DOJ investigators is that “BPD
investigators compromise officer interviews by failing to probe beyond reports the
accused officer already provided, and performing unrecorded ‘pre-interviews’ with
accused officers.” 185 The federal investigators found “numerous instances” in which
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 142–43.
178. See id. at 107. An investigation into an officer’s use of deadly force is not immune from such
compromising delays. The delays appear to be by design. It is standard practice that BPD investigators do
not interview an officer who discharges his/her weapons until after the State Attorney’s Office issues a
letter declining to prosecute the officer for a criminal act. It regularly takes the State Attorney’s Office
many months to issue such a declination letter. In some cases uncovered by the DOJ investigators, the
letter did not come until up to two years after the shootings. Id. at 107–08.
179. Id. at 143.
180. Id. at 144.
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 108.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 144.
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the official investigation interviews consisted of the accused officers orally reciting
their statements or administrative reports that they had reviewed just prior to the
interview, and the IID investigators not asking any questions. 186
This leads to the third failure discovered by the DOJ investigators: “BPD
risks compromising investigations by providing accused officers with a detailed
notice describing the alleged misconduct, often right after a complaint has been filed
and before any investigation occurs.” 187 The notice is not required policy, but is
frequently provided almost immediately after a complaint is filed and before any
investigative steps have been taken, and provides critical details about the allegation
and the civilian accuser. 188
These three failures just scratch the surface of the problems the federal
investigators found with the BPD’s practices for investigating police misconduct.
Indeed, the DOJ Report notes troubling issues at every level of the BPD’s process
for handling and investigating police misconduct complaints from the initial intake
of complaints to the supervision of complaint investigations. 189 Not surprisingly,
these deficiencies “contribute to BPD’s extremely low rate of sustaining allegations
of officer misconduct, which in turn leads to a lack of discipline and accountability
in the Department.” 190 Data reviewed by the DOJ investigators revealed that the
disciplining of a BPD officer for misconduct is a rarity:
Of the 1,382 allegations of excessive force that BPD tracked from
2010 through 2015, only 31 allegations, or 2.2 percent were
sustained. These allegations arose out of fourteen separate
incidents. In light of the significant evidence of excessive force
we found in our investigation, the low rate of sustaining excessive
force complaints is troubling. Similarly, BPD completed
investigations into 1,359 allegations of discourtesy from 2010
through 2015, and sustained just 2.6 percent of those allegations,
arising out of just fifteen incidents. This low number of sustained
outcomes is also concerning, considering the number of
community members we spoke to who described BPD officers
behaving in a rude or abusive manner during encounters with
community members. 191
In sum, the BPD is unable to police itself. Not only does the BPD fail to
provide Baltimoreans a means of seeking redress for officer misconduct, the
department actively discourages and stymies civilian efforts to hold offending
officers responsible for their unprofessional and unconstitutional conduct.

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 144–45. Maryland’s Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights requires that that an
accused officer obtain a basic notice of the allegations and five days to obtain counsel prior to questioning.
189. See, e.g., id. at 145 (“The deficiencies in BPD’s investigative techniques persist in part because
of ineffective supervision and training. Indeed, we found that most investigators receive no formal
investigative training.”).
190. Id. at 146.
191. Id.
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Unfortunately, the BPD is not an anomaly. Federal pattern and practice
investigations of police departments from around the country, particularly those in
cities with large black populations, have found similar accountability failures and
deficiencies. Federal investigators determined that the police department of
Ferguson, Missouri lacked “any meaningful system for holding officers accountable
when they violate law or policy,” and the department did “little to investigate the
external allegations that officers have not followed FPD policy or the law.” 192 An
investigation of the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) “confirmed that CPD’s
accountability systems are ineffective at deterring and detecting misconduct, and at
holding officers accountable when they violate the law or CPD policy.” 193 Federal
investigators found that it was New Orleans Police Department practice and policy
to “exclude from investigation many categories of serious officer misconduct and
fail to adequately investigate and track allegations of discriminatory policing.” 194 A
2014 federal review of the Cleveland Police Department concluded that the
department’s accountability systems fell “woefully short” in large part because
investigations of officer misconduct “are neither timely nor thorough, that civilians
face a variety of barriers to completing the compliant process, and that the system as
a whole lacks transparency.” 195
As Baltimore (as well as Ferguson, New Orleans, Chicago, and Cleveland)
demonstrates, the self-protection instinct of police department is a powerful force.
This instinct translates into processes and procedures that frustrate a civilian’s ability
to seek acknowledgement and redress through the department for unconstitutional
policing. This in turn impedes the collection of data that could be used in civil
litigation to prove that a police officer and/or a police department is engaging in
unconstitutional policing. The lack of available data further weakens the deterrent
effect offered by civil liability against dragnet policing abuse.

192. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV, supra note 145, at 82. In a near identical echo of the
BPD findings, federal investigators found that the Ferguson police department “makes it difficult to make
complaints about officer conduct” and “discourages individuals from making complaints” about officer
conduct. Id. And even when a citizen pushes through the discouragement and obstruction to report officer
misconduct “there is a significant likelihood it will not be treated as a complaint and investigated.” Id. at
83.
193. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, N. DIV. ILL.,
OF
THE
CHICAGO
POLICE
DEPARTMENT
47
(2017),
INVESTIGATION
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download. Federal investigators found “consistent patterns of
egregious investigative deficiencies that impede the search for the truth,” and that police misconduct
investigations by CPD “foundered because of the pervasive cover-up culture among CPD officers, which
the accountability entities accept as an immutable fact rather than something to root out.”
194. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE
DEPARTMENT
79
(2011),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/03/17/nopd_report.pdf.
195. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF
POLICE
38
(2014),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2014/12/04/cleveland_division_of_police_findings_letter.pdf.
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DOJ Investigations & Consent Decrees: Only As Powerful As Those
Charged With Enforcing Them.

A natural response to the criticisms raised in this article is that the DOJ
investigations and reports concerning the police departments of Baltimore and the
other cities show that “the system” effectively confronts and redresses discriminatory
policing, and therefore any harm caused by Strieff will be detected and mitigated.
But while the BPD DOJ Report (and the similar reports concerning other police
departments) is a welcomed and important change agent, its reach and power are
limited. First of all, the report does very little to mitigate the humiliation, frustration,
life disruption, and diminished self-worth experienced by black Baltimoreans who
lived for years (and continue to live) under the BPD’s unchecked regime of racedriven unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrest. The report comes way late for the
hundreds to thousands of black Baltimoreans who lived under, and were affected by,
the years of unchecked racially targeted dragnet policing, such as the 34 black city
residents who were stopped at least 20 times, and the seven black residents who were
stopped at least 34 times in 2010 through 2015. 196
Moreover, DOJ reports are change agents only if the respective departments
actually implement meaningful change in response. To avoid litigation, a regular
course after the DOJ finds that a police department engages in unconstitutional
practices, is for the DOJ and the police department (and/or the jurisdiction the police
department is located in) to enter into a consent decree addressing the department’s
deficiencies and problems. Consent decrees are binding agreements that must be
approved by a federal judge and overseen by a federal monitor. The agreements
detail the reforms and other practice and policy changes a police department must
institute to achieve fair and constitutional policing and establish trust with its
respective community. There are currently fourteen consent decrees in place between
the DOJ and police departments around the country, including Baltimore and its
police department. 197
Not surprisingly, some police departments are better at implementing the
reforms required under a consent decree than others. For Baltimore, the progress for
the first year under the consent decree was mixed. Of course, as acknowledged by
the federal monitor overseeing the city’s consent decree, “Achieving
transformational change in a large police department does not happen overnight.” 198
According to the first semi-annual report of the decree’s monitor, the BPD made
considerable progress towards the goals and obligations of the consent decree,
including revising policies regarding use of force, stop and searches, body camera
196. BPD DOJ REPORT, supra note 89, at 50.
197. See Jacey Fortin, Jeff Sessions Limited Consent Decrees. What about the Police Departments
Already Under Reform?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/us/sessionsconsent-decrees-police.html [https://perma.cc/CE3N-MHQT]; Kevin Rector, Federal Judge Approves
Baltimore Policing Consent Decree, Denying Justice Department Request for Delay, BALT. SUN (Apr. 7,
2017),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-consent-decree-approved20170407-story.html [https://perma.cc/WS4L-MWK5].
198. BPD MONITORING TEAM, BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT MONITORING TEAM, FIRST
SEMIANNUAL
REPORT
2
(2018),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59db8644e45a7c08738ca2f1/t/5b4f83b070a6ad75b5b8adb9/15319
37719069/BPD+-+First+Semiannual+Report+7-18-18.pdf.

54

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 50; No. 1

use, transportation of persons in custody, and sexual assault investigations, and has
“demonstrated a genuine commitment to reform.” 199 But the news was not all
positive. The monitor noted that while the political leadership of the Baltimore and
the BPD’s leadership are “fully committed to reform” it is still an open question
whether “BPD has the capacity to implement the linchpin requirements of the
Consent Decree.” 200 In other words, at this early stage of the consent decree the
federal monitor remains unconvinced that the BPD has the ability to obtain and
utilize the technology and staffing (including patrol officers) to “fulfill the Consent
Decree’s community-oriented policing goals.” 201
However, it is another of the decree monitor’s early findings that is of
critical importance to this article. The finding concerns the BPD’s response to the
shooting death of an on-duty detective after the federal monitor had been in place. 202
The BPD’s response included:
(1) stopping civilians and restricting access to a large, six squareblock area around the crime scene for several days after the threat
of an armed and dangerous suspect had dissipated; (2) conducting
warrant checks (i.e., investigations) of the stopped individuals
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that
the individuals had committed a crime; (3) searching certain
individuals at or inside the perimeter of the six square-block area
without probable cause and patting down at least one other person
without reasonable suspicion to believe he had a gun; (4) failing
to properly document whether there was probable cause for
certain arrests and whether individuals interviewed about the
shooting voluntarily consented to be interviewed . . . . 203
This response, in the eyes of the federal monitor, “calls into question the
[BPD’s] underlying capacity to ensure that its officers make stops, searches and
arrests consistent with the Consent Decree.” 204 For the BPD to engage in dragnet
policing while a federal monitor is scrutinizing the department raises significant
concern and doubt that the BPD, institutionally and at the individual officer level,
has the capability and will to end its history of racially discriminatory policing.
Finally, the force and utility of consent decrees, as well as the ability of the
DOJ to investigate police departments and uncover patterns and practices that

199. Id. at 6–7.
200. Id. at 6.
201. Id. at 6–7.
202. See Justin Fenton & Ian Duncan, Panel Finds Baltimore Police Det. Sean Suiter’s Death Was
Likely Suicide, Not Murder, Attorney for Widows Says, BALT. SUN (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-suiter-irb-suicide-20180827-story.html
[https://perma.cc/3JMZ-YYKT]. On November 15, 2017, Detective Sean Suiter was shot and killed while
conducting an investigation. He was shot in the head with his own service weapon. Suiter was shot one
day before he was supposed to testify before a federal grand jury about misconduct involving the BPD’s
specialized gun task force unit. Suiter’s death was later determined to be a suicide. Id.
203. BPD MONITORING TEAM, supra note 198, at 17 (emphasis added).
204. Id.
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promote, hide, and fail to punish unconstitutional conduct, are at the whim of the
Attorney General and the presidential administration she/he serves. The Obama
administration actively investigated police departments, particularly when officer
caused fatalities and other events lead to community protests and unrest. The DOJ,
under President Obama, opened twenty-five civil rights investigations into police
departments and sheriff offices around the country. 205 This activist approach resulted
in consent decrees with Baltimore, Ferguson, Cleveland, and other cities.
The Trump administration’s approach is 180 degrees unapologetically
different. Soon after his appointment, then-Attorney General Sessions directed the
DOJ leadership to review all consent decrees and assess whether the decrees aligned
with the new administration’s law enforcement objectives, principles, and
policies. 206 Many criminal justice reform activists feared that the review was the first
step toward rolling-back and neutering existing consent decrees. This fear proved
warranted when Session’s DOJ took aim at the Baltimore consent decree by asking
the federal judge charged with approving the decree, to delay his approval because
the Attorney General had “grave concerns” about the consent decree’s ability to
simultaneously promote public safety, strengthen law enforcement, and protect civil
rights. 207
The former Attorney General’s animus toward consent decrees is so
consuming and complete that one of his last official acts was to undercut and reduce
their use and efficacy. On his way out the door, having been fired by the president,
Sessions issued a departmental policy memorandum that criticizes consent decrees
as encroachments on state sovereignty, raises the bar for when the DOJ can enter
into consent decrees, and imposes new requirements for the implementation and
execution of consent decrees. 208 Under this new policy, a consent decree is
appropriate only if one or more of the following factors are present:
1. The [government entity] has an established history of
recalcitrance or is known to be unlikely to perform because, for
example, the [government entity] has violated other related
administrative orders, judicial orders, settlement agreements, or
consent decrees.

205. See Pete Williams, AG Sessions Says DOJ to ‘Pull Back’ on Police Department Civil Rights Suits,
NBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017, 11:47 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ag-sessions-saystrump-administration-pull-back-police-department-civil-n726826 [https://perma.cc/53ES-VPL4].
206. See Motion for Continuance of Public Fairness Hearing at ¶ 6, United States v. Police Dep’t of
Balt., No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB (D. Md. 2017), ECF No. 23.
207. Laura Jarrett & David Shortell, DOJ Has ‘Grave Concerns’ over Baltimore Police Reform Plan,
CNN
(Apr.
6,
2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/06/us/baltimore-consent-decree-publichearing/index.html [https://perma.cc/458V-Q9YS]. In denying the DOJ’s delay request and approving the
consent decree, United States District Court Judge James K. Bredar wrote: “The time for negotiating the
agreement is over.” Rector, supra note 197.
208. See Katie Benner, Sessions, in Last-Minute Act, Sharply Limits Use of Consent Decrees to Curb
Police Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/us/politics/sessionslimits-consent-decrees.html [https://perma.cc/C54Y-QMDZ]; see also
Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Civ. Litigating
Components
U.S.
Attorneys
(Nov.
7,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1109621/download.
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2. The [government entity] has unlawfully attempted to obstruct
the investigation by, for example, engaging in spoliation.
3. The [government entity] has engaged in a pattern or practice of
deprivations of rights or other violations of federal law, and other
remedies have proven ineffective, such that ensuring compliance
without the ongoing supervision of a court is unrealistic.
4. A consent decree is necessary to secure statutory protection or
relief for the [government entity], such as statutory protection
against challenges and claims by third parties or statutory relief
that preempts state law. 209
In sum, under this new policy, it is not enough for a police department to
have been found to practice unconstitutional and discriminatory policing that erodes
the community-police relationship. A consent decree is now appropriate only when
there is discrimination-plus – i.e., discrimination plus a history of resisting reforms,
obstruction of the DOJ’s investigation of the police department, and/or the failure of
alternative remedies. 210 And if approval is given, the new policy imposes
requirements that limit the force and power of a consent decree to bring about
institutional change. For instance, the new policy sets a three-year time limit on
consent decrees, requires consent decrees to include a “sunset” provision that
terminates the agreements upon a showing that the government entity “has come into
durable compliance with the federal law that gave rise to the decree,” and forbids
using consent decrees “to achieve general policy goals or to extract greater or
different relief from the [government entity] than could be obtained through agency
enforcement authority or by litigating the matter to judgment.” 211
VI. CONCLUSION
In characterizing the unlawful stop of Mr. Strieff as an “isolated instance of
negligence,” Justice Thomas downplayed (or ignored) the Pandora’s box of harm set
free by his opinion. 212 It is a characterization that drew ire from Justice Sotomayor
for good reason. 213 DOJ investigations and reports concerning police departments in
Baltimore, Ferguson, and other cities, show in stark and plain terms that black (and
increasingly brown) people in our cities are disproportionately targeted by police for
dragnet stops and searches without legal cause or justification. Today, we can no

209. Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, supra note 208, at 4.
210. To be clear, however, the presence of one or more discrimination-plus factors does not “guarantee
approval of a consent decree.” Id.
211. Id. at 5.
212. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
213. See id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Respectfully, nothing about this case is isolated.”);
id. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“That does not mean these stops are ‘isolated instance[s] of
negligence,’ however. Many are the product of institutionalized training procedures.”) (citation omitted).
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longer “pretend that the countless people who are routinely targeted by police are
‘isolated.’” 214
Strieff, combined with the widespread prevalence of warrants, not only
justifies, but encourages, such unconstitutional targeting. The majority opinion tells
police officers that unconstitutional conduct—stopping and seizing citizens without
legal justification and for unlawful bases such as race, will be completely sanitized
after the fact by something as simple and unrelated as a warrant for an outstanding
traffic ticket. In practice, the majority opinion is an endorsement of racially targeted
dragnet policing, and the specter of civil lawsuits or federal civil rights investigations
will not curb the use of the tactic nor provide sufficient remedies to those who will
suffer because of it.
The Strieff decision and how it will be used comes with a cost, and not just
the cost to the people (mostly of color) who will suffer because of it. There is a
societal cost that eventually has to be paid. As James Baldwin cautioned, “[T]he most
dangerous creation of any society is that man who has nothing to lose.” 215
Eventually, the community frustration and indignity that comes with being treated
as second-class citizens and subjects of a carceral state by the police reaches a boiling
point and boils over. 216 It happened in Baltimore on April 27, 2015, after Freddie
Gray, a 26-year old black man who had lived and grown up in the SandtownWinchester neighborhood discussed earlier, died as a result of injuries he sustained
while in police custody. 217 In the immediate days after Mr. Gray’s death, Baltimore
was besieged with protests (mostly peaceful) calling for police reform and the arrest
of the officers connected to Mr. Gray’s death. 218 Hours after Mr. Gray’s funeral a

214. Id. at 2071 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
215. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME, 90 (Delta Publ’g Co., Inc. 1963).
216. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“It implies that you are not a citizen
of democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.”).
217. On April 12, 2015, at about 8:45 am, Mr. Gray while standing on a street in his neighborhood,
made eye contact with patrolling police officers, and according to the charging documents filed by the
police, Mr. Gray then “fled unprovoked.” See Eyder Peralta, Timeline: What We Know About the Freddie
Gray
Arrest,
NPR
(May
1,
2015),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2015/05/01/403629104/baltimore-protests-what-we-know-about-the-freddie-gray-arrest
[https://perma.cc/7QTV-A7PX]. After a brief foot chase, police apprehended and searched Mr. Gray,
finding a knife clipped to the inside one of Mr. Gray’s pants pocket. Mr. Gray was then arrested.
According to the official police report about the incident, Mr. Gray was arrested without force or incident.
But a witness to the arrest alleged that the arresting offers forcefully folded Mr. Gray like “a piece of
origami,” with one officer putting his knee in Mr. Gray’s back while another bent Mr. Gray’s legs
backward. All the while, according to the witness, Mr. Gray was “screaming for his life.” Mr. Gray was
placed in the police transport van with his hands handcuffed and his legs shackled. He was placed head
first on the floor, on his stomach, and not secured or buckled-in. At some point between his arrest and a
long-ride in the police van through West Baltimore, Mr. Gray suffered a serious spinal injury. He was
transported to the hospital where he had surgery. Seven days later, April 19, Mr. Gray died. His death was
ruled a homicide. Id.
218. Six Baltimore police offers were charged by Baltimore’s state attorney’s office for various
offenses related to Mr. Gray’s arrest and death. See Kevin Rector, Charges Dropped, Freddie Gray Case
Concludes with Zero Convictions Against Officers, BALT. SUN (July 27, 2016),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-miller-pretrial-motions-20160727-story.html
[https://perma.cc/8P3N-7WFD]. The high-profile prosecution ended with zero convictions. The state
attorney’s office dropped their cases against three of the officers after the other three officers were
acquitted in bench trials. Id.
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few days later, however, Baltimore exploded as the protests were replaced with riots
during which buildings and cars were set on fire, businesses were looted, and police
and first responders were attacked. 219 Interviews of the protesters, rioters, and other
Baltimoreans revealed in plain terms that a principal cause for the unrest was not
racial in the sense of black versus white, but rather black versus blue, i.e the police
officers the black community viewed as occupiers imposing oppressive control and
abuse under the guise of policing. As a Baltimore church’s reverend explained to
reporters during the riots, “Police have a tradition to dehumanize, to beat down and
to show people who’s is charge. . . . It’s the blue uniform.” 220
Through Strieff, the Supreme Court has added to law enforcement’s arsenal
of stripping people of their citizenship and humanity. The decision now allows police
officers cover to engage in baseless racially targeted dragnet stops with little fear of
reprisal or discipline. The message of the majority opinion to black Americans is
clear: “your body is subject to invasion while courts excuse the violation of your
rights.” 221

219. See Holly Yan & Dana Ford, Baltimore Riots: Looting, Fires Engulf City After Freddie Gray’s
Funeral, CNN (Apr. 28. 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/27/us/baltimore-unrest/index.html
[https://perma.cc/NB4S-P7FZ].
220. Peter Hermann, John Woodrow Cox & Ashley Halsey III, After Peaceful Start, Protest of Freddie
(Apr.
25,
2015),
Gray’s
Death
in
Baltimore
Turns
Violent,
WASH. POST
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/baltimore-readies-for-saturday-protest-of-freddie-graysdeath/2015/04/25/8cf990f2-e9f8-11e4-aae1-d642717d8afa_story.html [https://perma.cc/BBG9-5K85].
221. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

